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INTRODUCTION
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina may be reawakening Americans to some of
the benefits of big government in preventing and responding to natural
disasters, but where the mitigation of subtler and longer-term risks to our
health, safety, and environment are concerned, the tide of sentiment still
runs powerfully the other way.
Here, the prevailing view still holds that government regulation is over-
zealous and needs to be reined in. 1 Hence the continuing campaign-now
well into its third decade-to review and roll-back regulations that are
deemed unduly costly; constrain the budget and the authority of regulatory
agencies; require ever more elaborate and cost-conscious analysis of
proposed regulations with more searching external review; and cap the
costs that agencies may impose on businesses, regardless of any benefits to
the public.
Environmental and public health advocates tend to assume, at least in
their public rhetoric, that this campaign is the product of ideological
extremism, "astroturf" lobbying, and special interest pandering by the
political right. This explanation is incomplete, however, because it fails to
account for the fact that the regulatory rollback movement draws on a
widely shared attitude of regulatory skepticism which rests, in turn, on a
1. The "prevailing view" to which I refer is the view that prevails in the White House,
the Congress, the appellate courts, and, to a considerable degree, the news media. The
opinion of scholars on this subject is sharply divided, as is public opinion. See infra notes 2,
4,11,23,25.
2. See generally Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109
Stat. 48 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2000)) (requiring quantitative and
qualitative cost-benefit analysis before proposing or promulgating any significant rule);
Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601, 801-808 (2000)) (providing for congressional
review of all major regulations issued by government agencies with the possibility of joint
resolution override); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1115-1119 (2000)) (requiring agencies to
develop multi-year strategic plans along with annual performance plans and reports). See
also Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Op-Ed., Regulatory Overhaul Report Card, WASH. TIMES,
June 10, 2002, at A17; Ellen Nakashima, For Bush's Regulatory 'Czar,' The Equation Is
Persuasion, WASH. POST, May 10, 2002, at A35; Recommendations for Improving Federal
Regulation: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Small Business, 107th Cong. 12-21 (2002) (statement of Robert W. Hahn,
Dir., AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies); Erin M. Hymel & Laurence H.
Whiteman, Regulation: Reining in the Federal Bureaucracy, in ISSUES 2002: THE
CANDIDATE'S BRIEFING BOOK 45 (Stuart M. Butler & Kim R. Holmes eds., The Heritage
Foundation 2002); C. Boyden Gray, Obstacles to Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
1, 1-5; W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1423, 1436-55
(1996). Historians will note that the campaign has largely succeeded in all the endeavors
listed above but the last.
3. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Science Under Attack: An
Interview with NRDC's Science Watchdog Jennifer Sass, http://www.nrdc.org/
health/science/ijsscience.asp (last visited May 5, 2006) (discussing corporate influence in
environmental regulation).
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carefully laid foundation of empirical evidence-evidence persuasive
enough to have made skeptics of such non-ideologues as Justice Steven
Breyer, Professor Cass Sunstein, and Professor Richard Stewart, among
others.4 So it is not enough to question the motives of regulatory skeptics.
We also must look at the evidence.
The evidence for regulatory skepticism consists mainly of a stream of
largely unverified tales of regulatory overkill, along with three groups of
more rigorous studies ("regulatory scorecards") that tabulate cost-benefit or
cost-effectiveness ratios across a broad array of social regulations. One
widely cited study claims that government regulations cost up to $72
billion per life saved.5 Another study claims that over 60,000 people lose
their lives needlessly each year as a direct result of irrational government
regulation.6 A third scorecard concludes that over half of all major
regulations issued since 1981 fail cost-benefit tests. 7
Prepared by well-known scholars and widely accepted as credible, these
scorecards have proved immensely influential in undermining confidence
in social regulation. Indeed, it is safe to say that they constitute the main
empirical foundation for the regulatory reform movement itself. However,
these studies also have aroused a vigorous scholarly debate. Critics have
challenged the methods of these studies and questioned the validity of their
conclusions. Undaunted, the authors of two of these three studies recently
responded with published articles that not only reject such criticisms, but
offer updated analyses that examine more recent rules using the same
disputed methods to reach the same negative verdict on regulation. The
authors conclude by calling for yet more scorecards.8
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993) (citing Morrall's
table as evidence that regulation tends to be tunnel-visioned and over-zealous); J. CLARENCE
DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE
SYSTEM 135, 137, 140-41 (1998) (relying on Hahn and Graham/Tengs scorecards to show
that the cost of many regulatory programs outweighs the benefits); Richard B. Stewart, A
New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 33 (2001) (citing
Hahn's scorecard as evidence that many environmental regulatory programs "entail costs
that substantially exceed benefits"); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 411-12 (1990) (discussing frequent failures of the regulatory system).
5. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 REGULATION 25, 30 (1986)
[hereinafter Morrall 1986].
6. Tammy 0. Tengs & John Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS AND LIVES SAVED: GETrING BETTER RESULTS
FROM REGULATION 172-73 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) [hereinafter Tengs & Graham,
Opportunity Costs].
7. ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 37-39(2000) [hereinafter HAHN 2000]. Hahn published a similar analysis earlier. Robert Hahn,
Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS AND
LIVES SAVED, supra note 6, at 208 [hereinafter Hahn 1996].
8. John Morrall, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
221 (2003) [hereinafter Morrall 2003]; Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of
Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1021, 1032-33 (2004)
[hereinafter Hahn, Response to Critics].
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The debate is joined. At stake is the rationality, or reputation for
rationality, of social regulation overall and the empirical bona fides of the
regulatory reform movement itself, with all its policy prescriptions. Given
the stakes involved, it is important that The issues be fully ventilated,
confusions eliminated, and the air cleared wherever possible. This Article
seeks to accomplish that goal.
Part I offers a brief history of the regulatory rationality debate for the
benefit of readers new to the controversy.
Part II reviews the leading issues implicated in the controversy and
evaluates the arguments put forward by both sides with respect to these
issues. It will be seen that, notwithstanding the defenses offered on their
behalf, the methodological shortcomings of strictly numerical scorecards
are serious, far-reaching, and probably fatal to their validity. The problems
arise not from the fact that scorecards compare costs and benefits of
regulation, but from the fact that they employ highly reductionist methods
to do so, methods that violate basic and widely-agreed principles of sound
analysis.
Part III responds to the main defense of scorecards-in essence, that any
number is better than no number and that there is no viable alternative to
strictly numerical scorecards. This Article will show that there is an
alternative-a very simple and obvious alternative. It involves careful,
retrospective analysis of the qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits
of allegedly flawed regulations in individual cases, along with careful
evaluation of the apparent reason for the "mistake" in cases in which
mistakes genuinely appear to have been made. Indeed, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) seems to be inching towards recognition
of this alternative in its recent proposal to undertake retrospective analyses
of important and controversial regulations.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
REGULATORY RATIONALITY DEBATE
Any evaluation of regulatory rationality must begin with a choice of
criterion for evaluation. Do we judge regulations by whether they
minimize social cost, maximize public protection, maximize agency
budgets or power, respond to public wishes (or wishes of the regulated
industry), faithfully implement particular statutory mandates, or reasonably
balance costs and benefits?
Although all these criteria, and others, are conceivable, the single
criterion most frequently applied in practice is the last one-the
reasonableness of the costs of regulation when weighed against the
benefits-and the conventional wisdom holds that many, if not most,
"social regulations" (that is, health, safety, and environmental regulations)
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do not fare well on a cost-benefit comparison. 9 Indeed, for over a decade
critics of regulation have launched withering attacks on health, safety, and
environmental regulation on cost-benefit grounds.
These attacks have taken two forms. The first involves a stream of oft-
repeated tales of regulatory over-kill: companies forced to clean up
Superfund sites to the point that children can eat the soil 245 days a year,
property owners denied development rights when the footprints of cows
were declared wetlands, and so forth.' Such tales-vivid, provocative,
influential-suffer from the usual pitfalls of anecdotes. They are often
circulated without prior verification. Among those (a relative handful) that
are ever truth-checked, a minority turn out to be largely true; others turn
out to have been distorted or exaggerated; still others simply fabricated.ll
Even for the true stories, one has no way of knowing, without further
analysis, whether the incident is typical of agency practice, or an
aberration.
9. Conservative critics of regulation apply this criterion almost ubiquitously.
Likewise, Congress requires agencies to perform a cost-benefit analysis for all major
individual rules and that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) submit an annual
report on the costs and benefits of federal regulation overall. 2 U.S.C. § 1511 (b) (2000).
10. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 12 (reporting the Superfund anecdote among
many others); 141 CONG. RFC. H4690 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. DeLay)
(retelling the footprints of cows anecdote); see also PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF
COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1995) (reciting a long litany of
examples of regulatory overkill).
11. For example, though the anecdote dealing with the Superfund sites has not been
squarely rebutted, it appears to be less clear-cut than Breyer's account would suggest. See
Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 313-15 (1995)
(noting that the Superfund site in question was zoned for residential development and that
Breyer's allegation turns on disputed assumptions about the concentration of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) on the site). The second anecdote is pure fabrication.
The "footprints of cows" to which former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay referred (in
successfully opposing Clean Water Act reauthorization) were not footprints at all. They
were "wetland sloughs" several feet deep and up to two hundred feet wide, which fill with
water every year to provide vital sustenance to local and migrating birds. In fact, the land in
question is not a pasture, but a forest that forms a part of the "only [remaining] large forest
habitat adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico." See Letter from David L. Hankla, Field Supervisor,
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Colonel Robert B. Gatlin, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (Apr.
19, 1995) (on file with author).
For evidence of the broader veracity problem in the use of anecdotes, see, for example,
Citizens for Sensible Safeguards, Myths & Consequences: Paying for the Use of Myths and
Distortions by Anti-Regulatory Zealots (May 17, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author), which collected 27 widely circulating, but false, anecdotes about government
regulation. See also Tom Kenworthy, Truth Is Victim in Rules Debate: Facts Don't Burden
Some Hill Tales of Regulatory Abuse, WASH. POST, Mar 19, 1995, at Al (relating anecdotes
that "have the ring of truth, but not the substance"); Jessica Mathews, Horror in the House,
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at C7 ("Every one of the most frequently cited [anecdotes] is a
fabrication."). Journalist Richard Lacayo reported that THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE,
supra note 10, is "amply stocked with ... loosely detailed horror stories about regulatory
mischief. Some of them are memorable; some partial or misleading; some flatly wrong."
Richard Lacayo, Anecdotes Not Antidotes: Philip Howard Is Everyone's Favorite Anti-
Regulatory Guru, But His Best-Selling Book Is Flawed, TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 40.
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The well-known shortcomings of anecdotes as vehicles of proof have
given rise to the second line of criticism, in the form of regulatory
scorecards. Regulatory scorecards are cross-cutting tabulations of key
statistics (costs, benefits, net benefits, or cost-per-life-saved) associated
with each of a large number of major federal regulations. These statistics
are then offered as objective and rigorous measures of the cost-benefit
rationality (or cost-effectiveness) of particular regulations, regulatory
programs, and regulatory agencies overall. While any number of
scorecards have been constructed, three Main Scorecards (actually groups
of scorecards) have been particularly influential and provide the focus of
the remainder of this Article:
* John Morrall's Review of the Record reports that more than one-
third of the 44 regulations in the sample cost over $100 million for
every life saved, with one regulation costing $72 billion per life.' 2
Dominating the cost-ineffective bottom third of his table are
environmental toxin controls.
* In Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost
Effectiveness, John Graham and Tammy Tengs examine 587
interventions for which cost information were available and report
that the interventions in their sample impose wildly disparate costs
ranging from less than zero (saving money) to more than $1 trillion
per life saved. 13 Again, the least cost-effective interventions in their
sample are those aimed at controlling environmental toxins. 14 Their
subsequent study, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, uses a computer simulation to calculate
how many additional lives might be saved at constant cost by
hypothetically reallocating funds to fully implement the most cost-
effective yet under-utilized lifesaving programs, with money
obtained by defunding cost-ineffective measures. Their finding, that
60,000 additional lives could be saved at constant cost, has been a
staple of regulatory skepticism since its publication. '" Based on this
study, Graham has referred to the current pattern of regulation as
"statistical murder." 16
12. Morrall 1986, supra note 5, at 30. Morrall's 2003 reply contains an updated table
that reaches essentially the same conclusions. See Morrall, supra note 8, at 221, 223-24.
13. Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995). The $1 trillion figure is derived by
multiplying $99 billion, the highest cost per life-year in the Tengs database, by 15, a
conservative estimate of the number of life-years associated with each life saved.
14. See id. (describing the results of the study, which show the most money spent per
life is spent on regulating toxins).
15. Tengs & Graham, Opportunity Costs, supra note 6, at 172.
16. Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Science, 104th Cong. 71, 79 (1995) [hereinafter Graham, Testimony on Risk Assessment and
Cost-Benefit Analysis] (statement of John D. Graham).
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0 In 1996, Robert Hahn, current Director of the AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, published Regulatory Reform: What
Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, which calculates and
compares costs and benefits for 92 major regulations enacted or
proposed over the period from 1990 to mid-1995.17 His updated
study in 2000, Regulatory Reform: Assessing the U.S.
Government's Numbers, examines 106 final regulations and 30
proposed regulations issued over the period from 1981 to 1996.18 In
both studies of his studies Hahn concludes that, while regulations
confer a net benefit on society overall, "[l]ess than half the rules
pass a neutral economist's benefit-cost test" using the government's
own numbers.' 9
The Morrall table has fueled sweeping critiques of regulation by Justice
Stephen Breyer, W. Kip Viscusi, Cass Sunstein, and other prominent legal
scholars .20 Leading economists (including Nobel Laureate Kenneth
Arrow) have relied on the Morrall study to argue for more "rational"
approaches to regulation.21  His study also was cited as evidence of
regulatory irrationality in the OMB annual reports to Congress and in
congressional testimony.22 Likewise, dozens of newspapers and magazines
have reported Tengs and Graham's claim that irrational federal regulation
is killing over 60,000 people per year, along with Hahn's conclusion that a
majority of major regulations fail cost-benefit tests.23 These claims have
reappeared in testimony before congressional committees, congressional
floor debates, scholarly journals, and the publications of some of
Washington's leading think tanks.2 4
The initial version of these scorecards circulated for eleven years, five
years, and seven years, respectively, before anyone stepped forward to
scrutinize their methods. That fact alone is sufficient to highlight the
17. See generally, Hahn 1996, supra note 7.
18. HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 32.
19. Id. at 38.
20. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 24-27; W. KIP Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 264 (1992); Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1436-
55; Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1547-48 (1996).
21. See Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 221 (1996) (claiming a
reallocation of regulation priorities could save more lives at the current cost or save the
same number of lives at a much lower cost); Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, Risk
Within Reason, 248 SCIENCE 559, 562-63 (1990).
22. For a thorough discussion of the myriad channels by which the Morrall table has
percolated through both the scholarly and policy communities, see Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 1982-84, 1987-91 (1998)
[hereinafter Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions].
23. See, e.g., Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345,
1350-53 (2003) (documenting the influence of all three scorecards on the debate over
regulatory rationality).
24. Id. at 1352 nn.25-27 (citing examples).
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dysfunction in the current regulatory debate. In some cases, the public
interest community has seemed so intent on opposing cost-benefit analysis
in principle that they have tended to give individual studies, even highly
influential studies, a free ride in practice by failing to inquire whether such
studies conform to basic principles of sound analysis.
Only relatively recently a few academics have begun to re-examine these
studies and the methods they employ. Lisa Heinzerling opened the debate
in 1998 with a critical review of the Morrall table, 25 followed in 2000 by
the Heinzerling and Ackerman critiques of the Tengs and Graham
scorecards,26 and by Grading the Government, my comprehensive review
of all three scorecards (and the first to scrutinize the Hahn studies), in
2003.27
The principal authors of the Main Scorecards have since replied to their
critics: Tengs in 2002 (replying to the Heinzerling/Ackerman critique),28
followed by Morrall in 2003,29 and Hahn in 2004.30 All authors defend
their methodologies and stand by their conclusions. Morrall and Hahn
offer updated analyses that apply the same methodology to reach
substantially the same conclusions as before.
The next Part reviews and evaluates the substantive issues and
arguments that have surfaced in this debate to date. As observers of the
controversy over cost-benefit analysis will appreciate, the debate over the
validity of scorecards tracks and illuminates the fault lines of the larger
debate over the merits of cost-benefit analysis of individual regulations.
Thus, the issues raised by the scorecards controversy shape not only the
way we view our government overall, but the way we assess each
individual regulatory decision that it makes.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH REGULATORY SCORECARDS
We begin with a threshold question: What is a regulatory scorecard? In
Grading the Government, I coined the term to refer to a study that is built
by extracting a few summary statistics-costs, benefits, net benefits, and/or
25. See Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 22, at 2069
(critiquing the Morrall study as overly narrow); Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving
Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate over Regulatory Reform, 13 RISK 151 (2002)
[hereinafter Misuse of Life-Saving Interventions Study].
26. Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 648, 664 (2002) [hereinafter Heinzerling & Ackerman,
Humbugs].
27. Parker, supra note 23.
28. See generally Tammy 0. Tengs, A Response to Lisa Heinzerling's Article "Five-
Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate over Regulatory
Reform," 1 PIERCE L. REv. 115 (2002). For Heinzerling's rejoinder to that reply, see Lisa
Heinzerling, Reply to Dr. Tengs'Response, 1 PIERCE L. REv. 121 (2003).
29. See Morrall 2003, supra note 12, at 221.
30. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8.
[58:2
2006] EVALUATING Go VERNMENT REGULA TORY PERFORMANCE 367
cost per life saved-from the lengthy cost-benefit analyses that accompany
each of a host of individual rules, and then tabulating these summary
statistics across all rules in the sample in order to generate what appears to
be a comprehensive picture of the cost-benefit rationality of programs,
agencies, or social regulation overall.31  This definition accurately
describes the Main Scorecards and several others like them.
One scorecardist has defended the scorecard enterprise by redefining the
term "regulatory scorecard" to encompass "either an accounting framework
or a description of summary statistics that help shed light on the
measurement of costs, benefits, or costs and benefits of a regulation or
several regulations." 32  Elsewhere, he expands the term even further to
sweep in studies of the quality of the agency analysis as opposed to the
substantive rationality of the rules themselves.33
By this point, the redefined term has become so vague that it could
include virtually any study of regulation or regulatory assessment.
Scorecards, redefined, become rather easy to defend. However, they also
lose any individualized identity. It is easy to answer a critique of A by re-
defining it to mean B and then alleging that the original criticism of A does
not apply to B. But this line of argument proves little and certainly does
not offer a defense of A.
Fortunately, all the scorecardists seem to have recognized the need also
to address the substantive issues in the debate, to which we now turn.
These issues arise first from concerns that the Tengs/Graham conclusions
are not robust and do not even follow logically from their own data, and
second from the discovery that all the Main Scorecards:
* rely on undisclosed data and nonreplicable calculations,
* employ nonrandom and biased sampling methods,
* misrepresent ex ante guesses about costs and benefits as actual
measurements,
* zero out all unquantified costs and benefits along with important
categories of quantified benefits,
* paper over the large uncertainties that are present in virtually every
regulatory analysis, and
* disregard all questions about the fairness of the distribution of cost
and risk. 3
31. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1348-49.
32. Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1024.
33. Seeid. at 1045.
34. In Grading the Government, I pointed out other errors that I do not address here.
For example, I argued that Hahn and Morrall probably undervalue the benefit of reducing
risk to human life and health and erroneously discount the value of lifesaving benefits
accruing in the future. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1370-75. Hahn accurately points out,
in response, that his estimate is supported by OMB practice, by a meta-analysis of several
studies by W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, and by the Environmental Protection
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
It will be seen that the first three of these defects are curable by better
practice. The last three pitfalls, however, are endemic to the enterprise of
compiling strictly numerical scorecards, rendering them a defunct mode of
analysis.
A. Avoidable Errors
1. Illogical or Nonrobust Conclusions (Tengs and Graham)
One of the most well-known and widely cited claims in the regulatory
literature-and in media coverage of regulatory issues-is the claim put
forward by Tammy Tengs, John Graham, and their co-authors that 60,000
additional lives could be saved each year at the current level of regulatory
expenditure by simply reallocating spending away from expensive
lifesaving interventions to more cost-effective interventions that are now
being under-funded or over-looked altogether.35  They also identify
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) programs aimed at controlling
environmental toxins as among the most wasteful of the bunch.36
Scholars and pundits have cited this finding as evidence of a symptom of
"paranoia and neglect" or even "statistical murder., 37 But does the study
actually establish such a malady?
Critics have pointed out that the study assumes, counter-factually, the
existence of some mechanism for efficiently shuffling funds among many
agencies and programs in order to achieve the "ideal" allocation imagined
in their computer scenario. 38  Without such a (currently nonexistent)
reallocation mechanism, no additional lives could be saved.
Critics also have pointed out that it is arbitrary and illogical to assume
that all the money for funding efficient Intervention A must come from
defunding inefficient Intervention B, as opposed to getting the funds from,
for example, a reduction in pork barrel spending. Yet without that
assumption, there is no statistical murder. 
39
Agency's (EPA) Science Advisory Board. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at
1038-39. While a number of other scholars have taken issue with the studies and
conventional wisdom on which Hahn relies, a full exploration of this complex issue lies well
outside the scope of this Article, and so I omit it here. See also Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, supra note 25, at 2042-56. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of
Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 189 (2000). The omission does not affect any
of the other critiques contained in this Article or alter my fundamental conclusion as to the
unavoidable invalidity of strictly numerical scorecards.
35. Tengs & Graham, Opportunity Costs, supra note 6, at 172.
36. See id. at 177.
37. Graham, Testimony on Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 16, at
79.
38. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1375.
39. See Heinzerling, Misuse of Life-Saving Interventions Study, supra note 23, at 162.
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The most fundamental issue, however, is whether Tengs and Graham
have truly shown that the current pattern of intervention is pervasively
irrational in the first place. On this point, Heinzerling has complained that
the authors' database includes a significant number of very expensive but
nonexistent interventions-interventions that are not implemented and
which exist only as hypothetical constructs in the mind of some analyst.
Heinzerling complains that these inclusions serve no purpose but to make
regulation look bad.4
This is a valid criticism of the earlier Five-Hundred Interventions Study
and Their Cost-Effectiveness, which lists the costs-per-life-year-saved
without any disclosure of whether the intervention in question is actual or
hypothetical. 41 However, it is not a fair objection to the Opportunity Costs
study that produced the 60,000 lives claim because the design of that study
requires the identification of regulatory opportunities (that is, currently
unimplemented interventions) in order to perform the hypothetical
reallocation.42 Moreover, inclusion of hypothetical high-cost interventions
does no harm in this study because such interventions by definition neither
supply funds (they are currently unimplemented) nor receive funds (they
are too costly). So the 60,000 lives claim is not affected in any way by the
inclusion of hypothetical, high-cost interventions.
The more basic problem with the Opportunity Costs study is that its
findings are not at all robust. Examining the unpublished database reveals
that over two thirds of the 60,000 additional lives saved through
reallocation are associated with fully implementing just two interventions:
continuous (versus nocturnal) oxygen for hypoxemic obstructive lung
disease and implementing a universal flu vaccine.43 Significantly, Graham
has done nothing to promote either intervention since taking office as
President Bush's regulatory czar. One wonders whether he is aware of his
Tengs' reply to Heinzerling treats this point as a matter of mere policy advocacy: "As a
matter of policy advocacy, Dr. Heinzerling is entitled to suggest that defense dollars should
be reallocated to environmental protection. Yet such a belief is not relevant to the validity
of our research design or the interpretation of our results." Tengs, supra note 25, at 117.
This response misunderstands the issue. The issue is not one of policy advocacy but of
logic: The charge of "statistical murder" (the main interpretation of their results offered by
Graham himself) requires the assumption that any dollar spent on Intervention A is thereby
deducted from funds allocated to Intervention B. Otherwise, the failure to implement B
cannot be laid at the door of A. If the assumption is groundless (and it is) because there are
many other potential sources of funding for Intervention B, then the interpretation fails, and
the "statistical murder" charge is left unsupported.
40. See Heinzerling, Misuse of Life-Saving Interventions Study, supra note 25, at 156
("[O]f the 90 environmental measures included in [the study], only eleven were ever
implemented.").
41. See Tengs, supra note 13, at 370-71.
42. See Tengs & Graham, Opportunity Costs, supra note 6, at 170-71.
43. Hahn's database is reproduced as Appendix B in Parker, supra note 23. The
interventions described above occupy rows 20 and 22, respectively.
ADMINISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW
own data. Or, is inoculating the entire population of the United States
against the flu perhaps a little more complicated, and a little less cost-
effective, than the analyst who predicted such great results for it assumed?
Likewise, on the expenditure side, the data suggest a rather different
picture than the conclusions Tengs and Graham draw from them. It turns
out that much of the $17 billion that gets reallocated, hypothetically, in the
optimization scenario aimed at maximizing lives saved, is generated not by
withholding funds from costly yet ineffective interventions but by investing
in a handful of negative-cost interventions. Indeed, half of that $17 billion
is generated by the opinion of a single author that banning residential
growth in tsunami-prone (or hurricane-prone?) areas would save $8.5
billion annually.44 If only life were as easy as that!
We are now in a position to appreciate the central problem with the
study. The Opportunity Costs study compares the actual costs of existing
interventions with starry-eyed advocates' estimates of what competing
interventions might cost, and accomplish, if they were fully implemented
(assuming they could be fully implemented). No wonder reality fares
poorly. How does any real intervention, or real person, compete with the
Glorified Alternative?
Having examined a problem unique to Opportunity Costs (with its
unusual reallocation exercise), we now proceed to a more general
examination of problems that plague all the scorecards.
2. Reliance on Undisclosed Data and Nonreplicable Calculations
At the heart of the scientific enterprise lies the requirement that scholars
publishing new findings be willing and able to furnish their raw data and
analysis to outside scholars who seek to replicate their results. When this is
not done, the relevant studies tend to be heavily discounted, as they should
be.
In this case, Morrall has not furnished any of his supporting data or
calculations, and Hahn and Tengs have offered only limited and partial
disclosures which, though helpful, still preclude outside verification of their
results.45
Heinzerling and I both raised this issue in our initial critiques of these
scorecards. Significantly, only one of the scorecardists has responded to
these criticisms. Morrall replies that his findings are "replicable" because
44. See Parker, supra note 23. Rows 3 and 139 discuss the costs of "ban[ning]
residential growth in tsunami-prone areas" and "construct[ing] sea walls to protect against
100-year storm surge heights."
45. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1359-62 (analyzing the gaps in disclosure that
preclude verification of the Hahn and Tengs/Graham results).
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the documentation supporting those findings is "on file" 46 and because he
has gone over his own calculations and found them plausible.47
These statements misapprehend what replicability means.
"Replicability" in the sense that scientists and other scholars use that word
requires that findings must be derivable by outside reviewers drawing on
the assumptions, sources, data, and methods of the original study. That
cannot be done without documentation that no scorecardist has yet seen fit
to provide.48
Writing in the influential journal, Science, Hahn recently opined,
"Government should be allowed to use those research findings in
developing regulations only after the agency has replicated the results or
has certified that the results have been independently replicated.
Replication is a key to ensuring the quality of results. 49 Unfortunately,
none of the scorecardists practice what Hahn has so eloquently preached.
That fact alone, by the standards applied in the scientific community, is
sufficient to disqualify these scorecards from further consideration.
3. Sampling Errors
The Main Scorecards rely on samples of rules drawn from the larger
population of social regulation. Their conclusions are valid only if the
samples chosen are shown to be fairly representative of the universe of
regulations from which these samples are drawn.
Tengs and Graham have acknowledged that their "dataset may not
represent a random sample of all life-saving interventions" because "those
economic analyses that researchers have chosen to perform and journal
editors have chosen to publish may be disproportionately expensive or
inexpensive., 50  The bias toward extremes in sampling yields a corollary
bias in favor of greater lifesaving through reallocation of funds.
46. Morrall 2003, supra note 8, at 228-29.
47. See id. ("I have examined each of the cost-effectiveness estimates questioned by
Heinzerling and Parker, and reviewed sources and reasons for the estimates that were
published.... I am convinced that my estimates are plausible ....").
48. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, which published Morrall's reply, is a peer
reviewed journal. Yet it would appear that peer review, in Morrall's case, did not involve
an audit of his data, adjustments to agency data, or authority for those adjustments because
that information is unavailable.
49. Linda R. Cohen & Robert W. Hahn, A Solution to Concerns Over Public Access to
Scientific Data; Suggestions to Improve Process Under Freedom of Information Act, 285
SCIENCE 535 (1999) (drawing on nearly identical conclusions derived from Hahn's previous
work). A note on the terms is in order here. I do not read this passage to suggest that
"replication" requires at least two comparable studies yielding the same result. It is
unreasonable, for instance, to expect a ten-year epidemiological study to be confirmed by a
similar separate study. Replication simply means that outside analysts are able to apply the
calculations described in the original study to the data used by the study and achieve the
results reported by that study.
50. Tengs, supra note 13, at 372.
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Morrall claims that he selected regulations meeting the criteria that
"lifesaving benefits must provide the majority of benefits and that non-
health benefits must not exceed compliance costs."'', However, as I
indicated in my earlier critique, perusal of the rules in his database reveal
that these criteria are not consistently applied: He includes rules that offer
significant health and ecological benefits that would appear to be excluded
from his numerical tally.52 However, given that Morrall altered agency
numbers in undisclosed ways, there is no way for any outside observer to
be absolutely sure of any statement about how he counted benefits.
53
Hahn includes regulations expected to cost more than $100 million
annually, which by law must be accompanied by a Regulatory Impact
Assessment (RIA) that yields cost and benefit information.54  However,
this criterion excludes from consideration all regulations that cost less than
$100 million but yield large benefits (the clearest success stories of
regulation) along with all unexploited "regulatory opportunities"
(opportunities for cost-effective regulations that were never taken or that
were made too weak). Both of these exclusions would tend to bias his
scorecards against regulation.
Hahn has replied that "Morrall's research provides a notable refutation
of this criticism" because Morrall later identified a few "new regulatory
opportunities that are both socially beneficial and attractive from an
efficiency standpoint," as did OMB.55 However, the relevance of this
observation to a defense of scorecards is unclear. One does not "refute" a
criticism by correcting, after the fact, a problem first raised by the critics.
That would appear more like an acknowledgment. Moreover, Morrall's
reissued analysis-which mentions a grand total of four regulatory
51. Morrall 2003, supra note 8, at 225. Heinzerling's initial critique of the Morrall
table pointed out that Morrall included a number of rules that were never actually
promulgated and that therefore should not be cited as instances of regulatory folly. See
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 25, at 2000-14. Morrall's
reissued table includes only final rules, yet he comes to the same conclusions as he did in his
initial study. See Morrall 2003, supra note 8, at 223. Therefore, reliance on rules that have
not been promulgated does not appear to be a major factor in his results.
52. See Morrall 2003, supra note 8, at 230-31 (listing the following rules with
abbreviated titles: Uranium Mill Tailings, Hazardous Waste Listings for Petroleum Sludge,
Sewage Sludge Disposal, Hazardous Waste Solids Dioxin, Prohibit Land Disposal, Land
Disposal Restrictions/Phase II, Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria-all of which offer
clear environmental benefits beyond human health protection); see also text accompanying
note 77 (discussing the formaldehyde rule).
53. Moreover, even if his criteria are straightforwardly applied, they are not clearly
neutral. Reading the fine print reveals that by "health benefits" Morrall means only
quantifiable and quantified benefits of avoiding hospitalization or permanent disability.
How is it neutral, one wonders, to include rules with significant unquantified benefits
(which may account for a significant share of their cost) but exclude those with large
quantified benefits that exceed costs, unless they involve avoidance of death,
hospitalization, or permanent disability?
54. See Hahn 1996, supra note 7, at 209.
55. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1027.
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opportunities--does not purport to reflect, and clearly does not reflect, the
full number or range of unexploited options for beneficial regulation.
5 6
Hahn's reply also points to two countervailing omissions that he believes
might offset the exclusion of some of the most beneficial rules and all
regulatory opportunities. First, he claims that sampling only "significant"
rules had the effect of omitting minor rules that lack the benefit of OMB
review and hence are more likely to be over-zealous and irrational than
large-scale rules that undergo OMB review.57 That rejoinder, however,
assumes the very point in issue-that agencies are systematically over
zealous and will over-regulate whenever they are not subject to an outside
check. An equally plausible scenario is that small rules flying "under the
radar" without the benefit of OMB oversight will also lack the impetus of
concerted public interest group pressure for greater stringency. In these
situations agency capture by regulated entities with concentrated interests
would seem at least as likely as over-regulation.
Second, citing Justice Breyer's concern with a "tunnel vision" that
allegedly causes agencies to regulate with irrational zeal, Hahn observes
that tunnel vision might cause agencies to overstate benefits and understate
costs in order to avoid OMB review or help their regulations pass OMB
review.58 If so, this too would be a source of contrary bias that might offset
any bias induced by his sampling methods. But this defense likewise
assumes the proposition-agencies are over-zealous-that scorecards are
meant to test.
Moreover, even if a countervailing bias were shown, one cannot answer
concerns with selection bias in one direction simply by coming up with a
56. See Morrall 2003, supra note 8, at 233. The handful of regulatory opportunities
identified by Morrall and OMB must be weighed against the scores of existing regulations
that OMB has recently put on the table for rollback or rescission. See OMB, OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2004) (Executive Summary
of Final Report at 1), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
2004 _cbexecsumm.pdf (identifying 189 regulations nominated and scheduled for reviewed
for possible modification or rescission). Significantly, the third scorecard, Tengs &
Graham, Opportunity Costs, supra note 6, did try to canvas unexploited regulatory
opportunities in a sustained way and found at least 60 such opportunities solely within the
population of published articles addressing unexploited life saving interventions. See
Parker, supra note 23, at 1441-52 app. B-3a (counting all regulations that cost less than $7
million per life and are less than 90% implemented).
57. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1028 (suggesting that agencies
might intentionally characterize new rules as "minor" so as to avoid OMB scrutiny).
58. See id. at 1028-29 ("[T]unnel vision [is] a 'classic administrative disease [that]
arises when an agency so organizes or subdivides its tasks that each employee's individual
conscientious performance effectively carries out single-minded pursuit of a single goal too
far, to the point where it brings about more harm than good."').
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couple of unquantified factors that might cause bias in the other direction.
Two or three biases running in opposite directions do not automatically
cancel each other out.
Finally, proponents of scorecards defend their skewed sampling methods
by claiming that there is no alternative.5 9 As it happens, there is an
alternative. It entails systematically canvassing agencies, outside analysts,
and policy advocates for leads to unexploited regulatory opportunities and
for high-benefit-low-cost regulations, and doing so with the same
systematic method and zeal that Graham has recently exhibited in soliciting
60
outside suggestions for regulatory modification or rescission.
Granted, such an undertaking would require considerable effort,
probably one organized by OMB. Even so, if proponents of regulatory
scorecards are committed to devising a fair test of government rationality
then they should call for, and commit to, that effort, not continue to
promulgate the results of partial and biased tests.
4. Reliance on Ex Ante Predictions (Reported as Ex Post Findings)
All three of the Main Scorecards routinely report ex ante estimates of the
costs and benefits of proposals for new regulation as if they were the actual
costs and benefits of the rules in question-a practice that has been
compared to reporting pre-game guesses about the outcome of an
upcoming Super Bowl as the actual score of the game.61
Grading the Government suggested, and scorecardists do not dispute,
that pre-rule assessments harbor a built-in tendency to understate net
benefits for the following reason: most regulatory assessments assume one
hundred percent compliance with the rule, that is, no waivers, variances, or
modifications. Yet most rules contain waiver or variance provisions, and
all rules are subject to later modification.62 If it turns out that compliance
with a regulation costs more than expected in particular cases, these
flexibility mechanisms can be, and routinely are, used.
Of course, such waivers and modifications may be expected to reduce
benefits as well as costs. But if such instruments are used sensibly (to
focus on situations in which inflexible application of a rule would impose
costs grossly disproportionate to benefits), use of these flexibility
mechanisms should reduce incremental costs more than benefits, yielding
59. See id. at 1029.
60. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1417-20.
61. Seeid. at 1367.
62. See id. at 1368-69 (arguing that predictive estimates that ignore the flexibility of
implemented regulations necessarily underestimate their benefits).
[58:2
2006] EVALUATING Go VERNMENT REGULA TORY PERFORMANCE 375
an overall increase in net benefits. 63 By the same token, ignoring such
mechanisms may be expected to yield a downwardly biased estimate of net
benefits.
Once again scorecardists defend principally on grounds that "there is no
obvious alternative. 6 4  Once again, this is incorrect. There is an
alternative to relying exclusively on ex ante estimates. A number of
scholars, including Hahn himself, have called for increased use of
retrospective studies of regulatory costs and benefits, as has OMB.65
Moreover, even if there were no alternative to ex ante studies, there
obviously is an alternative to reporting the results of such forecasts as "the"
costs and benefits of regulation. One at least can be clear about what one is
doing.
B. Intrinsic Errors
The shortcomings mentioned above are curable by better practice. We
now come to a series of shortcomings which cannot be cured because they
are endemic to scorecards. These are the shortcomings that categorically
undermine scorecards as a genre of analysis.
1. Excluding Unquantified Benefits
The widely recognized "Annapolis Principles" for responsible cost-
benefit analysis state: "Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or
expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to assure that quantitative
factors do not dominate important qualitative factors in decisionmaking.,
66
Notwithstanding this admonition from within their own discipline, the
Morrall and Tengs/Graham scorecards focus exclusively on lifesaving
benefits, or quantified benefits of avoiding hospitalization or disability,
which are converted to life-equivalents. Hahn's Government's Numbers
scorecards sweep only slightly more broadly, counting benefits of reducing
risk of accidental death or injury as well as cancer, heart disease, lead
poisoning, and harms (both health and ecological) arising from five listed
air pollutants 7
63. For an excellent overview of the opportunities offered by variances and waivers to
improve regulation after the rule, see Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving
Regulation Through IncrementalAdjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004).
64. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1029 ("[T]here is no obvious
alternative at this point to using the ex ante studies, though it may be possible to improve
their reliability in the future.").
65. See HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 63 (suggesting retrospective studies to complement
prospective studies); Parker, supra note 23, at 1369-70 (noting that obstacles of expense and
difficulty are insufficient to excuse retrospective analysis of regulation).
66. KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH
AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 10 (1996).
67. See HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 40.
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Omitted from these tallies are all benefits of procedural rules, disclosure
rules, and rules promoting compliance assurance and enforcement, since
such rules do not directly lead to countable health or ecological endpoints.
Yet, strangely, rules aimed or yielding such benefits are not excluded from
Hahn's database. The rules are included, but their benefits are not. Also
excluded from the scorecard tally are an assortment of health benefits,
including reproductive and developmental health benefits, which are
described but not quantified in agency analyses (or which may have been
quantified but fall outside the scorecardists' narrow categories of countable
benefits).
As a direct result of such omissions, it turns out that 41 of the 136 major
regulations appearing in Hahn's tabulation are assigned a zero benefit. Not
a zero net benefit, but a zero benefit, meaning the regulations have no use
whatsoever. Moreover, even rules that show a positive number in the
benefits column have had whole categories of benefits excluded from the
tally.
68
Gauging the precise impact of all these exclusions would require a case-
by-case analysis of all the rules in scorecardists' databases, a project well
beyond my scope. However, the nature and potential significance of these
exclusions are well illustrated in the following three examples, two of
which are drawn from Hahn's study. and one from Morrall's.
The EPA's Great Lakes Water Quality Guidance. EPA's Great Lakes
Water Quality Guidance was issued to reduce, by six to eight million
pounds a year, the discharge of persistent, toxic, and bio-accumulative
pollutants such as mercury, cadmium, lead, PCBs, DDT, dioxin, chlordane,
heptachlor, dieldrin, pentachlorobenzene, and mirex into the Great Lakes. 69
These are compounds of undeniable toxicity whose risks, as EPA pointed
out, include neurotoxicity, fetotoxicity, endocrine disruption, hematological
impairment, reproductive dysfunction, sensory and equilibrium
disturbances, hyperactivity, and impairment of peripheral vision, hearing,
and speech. These compounds pose special risks to fetuses and infants
because they bio-accumulate in the mother's fatty tissues and pass through
to the fetus and the breast-fed infant. They also threaten significant
ecological harm to the Great Lakes system and the wildlife inhabiting it,
since wildlife obviously do not have the options that humans have in
choosing the food they eat and treating and filtering the water they drink.7v
68. Parker, supra note 23, at 1383.
69. See Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,366
(Mar. 23, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 131, 132) (attempting to provide
protection for fish and shellfish in the Great Lakes area).
70. See Proposal to Amend the Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes
System to Prohibit Mixing Zones for Bioaccumulative Chemicals of Concern, 64 Fed. Reg.
53,632, 53,638-53 (Oct. 4, 1999) (describing the negative health effects on both humans and
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Despite their evident hazard, the noncancer risks of these toxins are very
hard to quantify on a mass scale, even for humans. Unlike cancer, which is
widely assumed to have a linear dose-response down to a zero exposure
level (making the calculation of population risk from aggregate exposure
data relatively simple), noncancer endpoints generally have nonlinear risk
thresholds. This means that, to calculate a population risk from any given
discharge, you have to know not only the exact exposure of the population
to the pollutants targeted by the particular regulation, but you also have to
know the cumulative exposure of individuals in the population to these and
other interacting pollutants from other sources. '
Data at this level of detail is simply not available for most compounds
and most people most of the time. As a result, noncancer risks from these
compounds are exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to quantify at the
population level.72 Moreover, the persistent and bio-accumulative
character of toxins addressed in this rule means that past experience--even
if it could be accurately characterized-may not be a valid guide to future
risk. In this case, EPA concluded that available data permitted
quantification only of the benefits of reducing incidence of fatal cancer to
sports anglers and Native American subsistence fishermen who eat fish
they themselves have caught in the Great Lakes. That number, after
extensive manipulation, became Hahn's number for the total benefit of the
rule.
To believe that the agency's numbers tell the whole story of EPA's Great
Lakes Water Quality guidance, one would also have to believe that the sole
benefit of reducing toxic, bio-accumulative discharges into the Great Lakes
by six to eight million pounds a year is a single incident of cancer
prevented every three years.73 That is not the case, and it is not the picture
that emerges from a fair reading of EPA's explanation of the basis and
purpose of the rule.
The EPA's 1995 Municipal Waste Combustor Rule. EPA's Municipal
Waste Combustor Rule required the installation of filters that will reduce
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emissions from waste combustors, a
the wildlife of the region).
71. See id. at 53,638-39 (explaining the adverse human health effects that may result
from the consumption of contaminated fish).
72. See id. at 53,639 (identifying various environmental conditions that make these
calculations difficult).
73. Ironically, Hahn's own unpublished spreadsheet (supplied in a more detailed form
to this author) narratively records some of the benefits that his tabulation excludes. See
Hahn Unpublished Spreadsheet, at cell CA-14 (noting that pollutant loadings under the rule
would be reduced by 5.8 to 7.6 million lbs-eq/yr.) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author); id. at cell AV-14 (calculating, after discounting, that the rule will avert only .3
cancer deaths per year); id. at cell BG-14 (remarking erroneously "no non-fatal benefits
listed").
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benefit that Hahn monetizes.74 This benefit, however, misses the primary
purpose of the rule, which was to reduce, by 70 to 99 percent, combustor
emissions of dioxin, cadmium, mercury, and lead, all of which issued from
combustor smokestacks and were not then subject to any federal controls.
These are toxic, persistent, and bio-accumulative compounds that are
known to be hazardous to human health in very small doses. The
rulemaking record makes clear that EPA considered reducing emissions of
dioxin and heavy metals a major benefit of the rule.75 Yet because EPA
could not find a scientifically defensible method for quantifying and
monetizing the benefits of reducing exposure to these toxins, the entire
benefit of reducing dioxin and heavy metals emissions is zeroed out in
Hahn's accounting system, leaving the rule quantitatively defended only by
what are arguably its least important benefits.76
Formaldehyde. The most exorbitantly costly rule in Morrall's original
tabulation is an OSHA rule regulating formaldehyde exposure in the
workplace. At $72 billion per life saved, that rule does indeed appear
unreasonably expensive. What Morrall's table fails to disclose is that
OSHA's rule-beyond preventing about one cancer fatality per year (or
one hundredth of a fatality per year after Morrall's adjustment and
discounting)-was also expected to yield a host of benefits that were not
monetized but were clearly substantial: reduced or avoided burning eyes or
noses, sore or burning throats, asthma attacks, chronic bronchitis, allergic
reactions, dermatitis, and skin sensitization for up to 500,000 American
workers per year.77
Is avoiding such discomforts and health hazards for half a million
American workers "worth" the expenditure of $36 million a year by a $30
billion dollar group of industries? Will installing ventilators in the
workplace also reduce employee exposure to other irritating and possibly
hazardous chemical vapors?
These are the central questions of the formaldehyde rulemaking. They
are quite unlike (and far more complex than) the question implicitly posed
by the Morrall table: How could OSHA be so foolish as to propose a rule
that will cost $72 billion for every life saved?
74. EPA, Emissions Guidelines: Municipal Waste Combustors, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,228
(proposed Sept. 20, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Emissions
Guidelines Municipal Waste Combustors Proposed Rule]. Hahn's spreadsheet tally for this
rule is reproduced in Parker, supra note 23, at 1467 app. C, row 32.
75. See Emissions Guidelines Municipal Waste Combustors Proposed Rule, supra note
74, at 48,239 (documenting, without quantifying, significant risks of heavy metals emissions
and corollary benefits of reducing such emissions).
76. Id. at 48,238; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Municipal
Waste Combustors, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,198, 48,207 (proposed Sept. 20, 1994) [hereinafter
NSPS Municipal Waste Combustors Proposed Rule].
77. See generally Dep't of Labor, Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed.
Reg. 50,412 (Dec. 10, 1985) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
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Although a full delineation of the regulatory benefits excluded from the
scorecards is beyond my present scope, there is no reason to assume that
the formaldehyde rule is atypical. Most toxins that cause cancer may be
expected to cause a rash of other health problems, avoidance of which
(through use of simple devices such as ventilators) might well justify a
moderately priced rule. If you focus only on quantified benefits to the
exclusion of all benefits the agency narratively describes, you may miss the
main point of the rule. That is why OMB has recently advised agencies
that when "you are unable to estimate the value of some of the ancillary
benefits [of a rule], the cost-effectiveness ratio will be overstated, and this
should be acknowledged in your analysis."78 Regrettably, scorecards fail
to follow this sound advice.
The list of examples could go on. Many rules are accompanied by
preambles or impact assessments that describe substantial categories of
benefit-disclosure benefits, compliance oversight benefits, noncancer
health and ecological benefits-which the agency recognized as potentially
significant but lacked the data to quantify or monetize precisely, and which
numerical scorecards therefore inherently zero out.79 No one attempts to
defend exclusions of unquantified benefits, or benefits that are quantified
but not monetized, on principled grounds. Instead, it will be seen that
scorecardists have offered five practical justifications for their accounting
methods:
* zeroing out unquantified benefits makes little difference to results,
* certain costs are also excluded, and omitted costs may cancel out
omitted benefits,
" assigning a nonzero monetary number to unquantified benefits
would be "totally arbitrary,"
* zeroing out unquantified benefits is appropriate because it will give
agencies an incentive to try harder to quantify benefits, and/or
* comparing monetized costs and benefits is useful even if the
comparison does not capture all costs or benefits.
78. See OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis: Memorandum to the Heads of
Executive Agencies and Establishments, reprinted in OMB, INFORMING REGULATORY
DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, app. D,
at 131 (2003) [hereinafter OMB GUIDANCE (2003)], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003-cost-ben final rpt.pdf.
79. Hahn's reply also suggests that adding back "non-standard benefits," which
agencies monetized but which he zeroed out, would only add two more successes. See
Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1039. Even if this is the case-we have to take
his word since his calculations are not available-this does not address the impact of
ignoring benefits that agencies quantified but did not monetize, along with all benefits that
they considered significant but were unable to quantify.
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The remainder of this subsection examines and responds to each of these
defenses in turn. It will be seen that none of these defenses withstands
scrutiny.
The Harmless Error Defense. One possible response to concerns with
excluded variables is that the omissions are harmless, either because such
benefits are small or because omitted benefits are cancelled out by omitted
indirect costs. Hahn's reply, for example, claims that excluding "rules with
zero benefits" from the database only increases the pass rate of the
remaining regulations, in this case from 43 percent to 59 percent. 80
At least four things are problematic about this response. First, increasing
the pass rate from 43 percent to 59 percent is not exactly a trivial impact.
Second, as I showed in Grading the Government, Hahn's so-called "rules
with zero benefits" are not, in fact, rules with zero benefits. They are
simply regulations for which Hahn has inscribed a zero in the benefit
column of the spreadsheet, notwithstanding the fact that the agency in
question may have described substantial benefits narratively and may even
have monetized them in some cases. 8' .
Third, one cannot correct the erroneous treatment out of beneficial
regulations by simply excluding them from the database. One has to
reckon with the possibility that some or all of these excluded regulations
(such as requiring major air polluters to have a permit or requiring
reporting of toxic chemical releases) may actually have been cost-justified.
If all are justified, then the pass rate increases from 43 percent to 74
percent. 
82
Fourth, and this is by far the most important point, the practice of
zeroing out benefits is not confined to rules that yield exclusively
unquantified benefits. Scorecards also exclude large categories of nonzero
but only partially quantified benefits. Indeed, all the examples cited above
80. Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1039.
81. Parker, supra note 23, at 1381-1400 (giving multiple examples of rules yielding
substantial benefits that the agency narratively described but could not quantify and that
therefore received a zero in the benefit column of Hahn's spreadsheet). See id. at 1463-84
app. C (reproducing Hahn's spreadsheet). Hahn's "zero-benefit rules" include a rule
requiring double hull construction for oil tankers to help prevent massive oil spills (row 29);
a procedural rule requiring major air polluters to hold emissions permits, thereby facilitating
compliance with and enforcement of emissions standards (row 5 1); a rule requiring the
public reporting of releases of certain toxic chemicals from manufacturing facilities (row
67); a Clean Water Act rule aimed at protecting sensitive coastal areas from nonpoint source
water pollution (row 73); and a rule to protect millions of agricultural workers from unsafe
exposure to harmful pesticides (row 78). Id. at 1382.
82. This number is derived as follows: Of the 106 final rules in Hahn's database, 34
were assigned a zero benefit. See Parker, supra note 23, at app C. With these 34 rules
excluded, Hahn reports that "59[%] of the remaining 74 regulations pass a benefit-cost test
in the base case." Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1038. That corresponds to 44
rules. Adding 44 and 34 yields a total of 78 successes, which is 74% of the 106 rules in the
database.
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(and many more) are rules for which some lifesaving benefits are
quantified, while other significant benefits are mentioned but left
unquantified.
The Omitted Cost Defense. One variant on the theme that omitted
benefits are insignificant is the allegation that they are, in essence, canceled
out by omitted costs. Scorecard proponents rightly point out that
regulatory agencies also fail to quantify certain costs of complying with
social regulation, an omission that may tend to cancel out the impact of
omitting unquantified benefits. From this they conclude that "it is virtually
impossible to argue on the basis of first principles that there is a clear
antiregulatory bias" to scorecards. 83
This rejoinder, however, overlooks the fact that excluded costs are often
not likely to be of the same order of magnitude as excluded benefits. In
practice, unquantified costs usually take the form of lost competitiveness,
profitability, and employment that accompany large compliance costs
measured as a proportion of net revenues. Agencies generally bend over
backwards to avoid imposing such costs, and studies have routinely shown
that competitiveness impacts of existing social regulations have been
small.84 The record thus lends little or no basis for simply assuming that
excluded costs generally cancel out the exclusion of many health, and
virtually all ecological, benefits.
Again, two biases of unknown magnitude and opposite signs cannot be
assumed to cancel each other out. If the relative magnitudes of these
opposing biases cannot be assessed categorically, then the net effect must
be determined case-by-case-which returns us to the need for
individualized investigation of each case.
83. Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1040.
84. For examples of agencies examining and voicing concern to avoid competitiveness
impacts, see EPA, Federal Standards for Marine Vessel Loading and Unloading Operations
and NESHAP for Marine Tank Vessel Loading and Unloading Operations, Regulatory
Impact Assessment, RIN 2060-AD02, June 10, 1995, Addendum to Ch. 7 (unpublished
document on file with author) (noting that rule had been revised in the late stages of
development to reduce the number of affected facilities from 61 to 28 in order to "greatly
reduce" the "number of terminal facilities potentially put under competitive pressure"). See
also Parker, supra note 23, at 1400-02 (listing the omitted indirect costs and their
importance). For evidence that the competitive impacts of regulation are generally small,
see Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 157-58
(1995) (discussing the low impact of excluded costs on the manufacturing sector
specifically); Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 97, 98 (1995)
(suggesting that environmental regulations may enhance corporate competitiveness,
yielding negative omitted costs).
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The Arbitrariness Defense. Scorecardists tend to insist that they have no
choice but to assign unquantified benefits a zero value because any other
value would have been "totally arbitrary., 8 5 We are left to wonder why
scorecardists assume that zero is somehow plausible and not arbitrary. One
can imagine a wide range of plausible numbers that might be used to
summarize the incompletely quantified benefits of eliminating the
discharge of six to eight millions pounds per year of persistent and bio-
accumulative toxins into the Great Lakes or eliminating 80 percent of
mercury emissions from municipal waste combustors. The one value that
is not a plausible proxy for such benefits is zero. Yet that is the value that
numerical scorecardists implicitly choose for any variable that they cannot
reliably quantify.
The Policy Defense. A fourth common justification for zeroing out
unquantified benefits is that it is good policy to do so because "it gives
regulatory agencies an incentive to provide more information on
quantifiable benefits and costs." 86 There are at least two flaws in this line
of reasoning. The first flaw is that scorecardists do not disclose in their
studies that they are using scorecards as an instrument to punish agencies
for failing to quantify benefits in order to encourage them to make greater
efforts at quantification in the future. Rather, they offer their scorecards as
measures of the costs and benefits of regulation.
The second flaw arises from the fact (discussed above) that some
benefits are impossible to quantify. How does one quantify the benefit of a
procedural rule requiring that major sources of air pollutants hold a permit
or requiring that factories disclose their emissions of toxic chemicals into
the air we breathe? How does one quantify or monetize, given the state of
existing knowledge, the benefit of avoiding the build-up of persistent and
bio-accumulative toxins in the Great Lakes?
Scholars have wrestled with such questions for decades, without
resolution. Scorecardists offer no answers. Agencies are routinely
excoriated for making arbitrary choices and advised to rely on "sound
science" alone. Yet no one has yet identified a sound scientific method that
would permit the rigorous quantification of many of the benefits
(particularly in the realm of process, noncancer health protection, and
ecological risk reduction) that social regulations aim to achieve.
Of course, agencies could come up with a number. But in many cases
the number would not have a sound scientific foundation, and regulatory
critics would complain that it is groundless. Herein lies the catch-22 that
numerical cost-benefit analyses (including scorecards) pose for agencies:
85. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1037 (noting his rationale for
assigning "a zero dollar value to unquantified benefits and cost categories").
86. Id.
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If agencies try to assign numbers to a benefit that cannot, in fact, be
scientifically quantified and monetized based on available data and
methods, they will be accused of fudging the numbers and practicing
unsound science. But if they do not assign a number and simply describe
the benefit narratively, the critics of regulation will zero that benefit out.
Under these circumstances, it is hard for this observer to see the merit of
zeroing out unquantifiable benefits in order to encourage agencies to work
harder to quantify them.
The Partial Truth Defense. Scorecardists' final argument in defense of
zeroing out unquantified benefits is that counting such benefits is not their
purpose and that there is something to be gained from comparing the
"government's numbers" (that is, monetized costs and benefits) even if one
grants that such numbers do not tell the whole story.87
There are two things wrong with this line of defense. First, when
scorecardists assign arbitrary zero values to unquantified benefits that are
clearly described and are clearly substantial-such as the benefit of
requiring air polluters to have a permit or eliminating the discharge of
millions of pounds of persistent, bio-accumulative toxins into the Great
Lakes ecosystemSS-the zeros in the benefits column are not government
numbers. They are made-up, scorecardists' numbers.
Second, scorecards generally are not presented to the public as studies of
the degree to which agencies quantify and monetize benefits or as tests of
the degree to which monetized benefits exceed monetized costs. They are
touted as studies of "the costs" and "the benefits" of regulations, with no
caveat in view, the unmistakable implication being that the studies tell us
something meaningful about the substantive rationality of the regulations in
question and the regulatory system overall. 89 For that to be the case it must
87. See id. at 1037-38.
88. See discussion supra Part 1IB.1.
89. Thus, Hahn observes that "[o]nly regulations based on the Clean Air Act and the
Safe Drinking Water Act yield positive net benefits." HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 44. He
claims his analysis shows that "[l]ess than half the rules pass a neutral economist's benefit-
cost test;" that "net benefits would increase substantially if agencies rejected such rules;"
that "society could spend its regulatory dollars more wisely;" and that all manner of
"regulatory reform" proposals, which he details in that and later studies, are therefore
justified, Id. at 38, 57. Note that the reference is to "net benefits," not "net monetized
benefits" or even net "quantified benefits." Morrall likewise claims to have examined "the
benefits and costs of the regulations" in his database and to have concluded that "safety
regulation appears to be far more cost-effective than health regulation" and that, "[t]aken as
a group, the final rules issued by the three Department of Transportation agencies ... are
about 83 times more cost-effective than those of EPA." Morrall 1986, supra note 5, at 32.
One will look in vain through either study for a clear declaration that numbers tell only part
of the story about regulatory rationality and that focusing on potentially significant but
unquantified benefits (which agencies describe) might well yield a different, and more
benign, picture of regulation.
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be shown, empirically, that excluded costs and benefits are, as a general
matter, immaterial to the analysis. To date, no scorecardist has even
attempted such a showing.
What are the consequences of acknowledging the reality that some
perfectly real and valid benefits (such as the benefit of capturing Osama bin
Laden) simply cannot be quantified? Do contributions that are neither
quantified nor monetized-when combined with the quantified and
monetized benefits-justify the expense of the rule in each case? These are
harder questions that this study cannot answer definitively. A careful
answer would require a detailed study of the facts of each case and
inevitably would require expert judgments about which people might
disagree. In short, it would require the kind of in-depth, three-dimensional
investigation that I call for and that is the antithesis of the numerical
scorecard approach. 90
2. Occluding Uncertainties
The Main Scorecards all present their findings about regulatory costs and
benefits to three or more significant digits, thereby implying that measured
costs and benefits are certain to at least one-tenth of one percent. 9' In
response to criticism from this author, Hahn concedes that he should not
have used three significant digits but that "rounding to two significant
digits is probably reasonable," thereby speciously claiming a margin of
error within one percent. 92
In fact, it is not uncommon for the costs, benefits, and net benefits of a
rule to be unknown even to within an order of magnitude. In some cases,
the range of uncertainty left at the end of agency cost-benefit analysis may
extend several orders of magnitude. 93  Even this level of uncertainty
90. See discussion infra Part III.
91. Compare Morrall 1986, supra note 5, at 30 (presenting cost-per-life-saved data with
three significant digits), with HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 43 tbl. 3-5 (presenting net
benefits to three significant digits), and Tengs & Graham, Opportunity Costs, supra note 6,
at 176 (claiming that more rational pattern of lifesaving interventions could save an
additional 60,200 lives per year).
92. Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1033 n.57.
93. See, e.g., OMB GUIDANCE, supra note 78, at 87-91 tbl. 18 (2003) (listing the benefit
of complying with EPA's accelerated phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals at $1 to $4
billion, a factor-of-four variation; listing the benefit of reducing evaporative emissions from
light-duty vehicles at $274 to $1246 million, another factor-of-four range of uncertainty;
listing the annual benefit of the acid rain program at $1 to $5 billion, a factor-of-five range;
listing the benefit of reducing nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from non-road compression
ignition engines at $600 to $3,000 million, a factor of five range). Moreover, these large
ranges ignore the uncertainty introduced by the inclusion of unquantified but policy-
significant variables. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J.
2255, 2258 (2002) (noting that, depending on one's assumptions, estimates of the benefits of
President Clinton's new federal standards for permissible arsenic concentrations in drinking
water ranged from $10 million to $1.2 billion, a factor-of-100 range of uncertainty).
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ignores the impact of including benefits that are narrated and known to be
significant but are not quantified.
Principles of sound cost-benefit practice require full and candid
disclosure of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis to explore the impact of
varying key parameters, individually and collectively, across their range of
uncertainty. The policy of scorecardists, by contrast, is to ignore most
uncertainties and just report the "best estimate" (usually the median value)
of any range.
Hahn's is the only scorecard to offer any sensitivity analysis whatsoever,
and his sensitivity analysis examines only the impact of (a) varying life
value and discount rate over a range from three to seven million dollars and
three to seven percent, respectively; and (b) choosing a range of possible
values for the estimated benefit of reducing emissions of five listed air
pollutants. 94  His 2004 reply to his critics offers a further sensitivity
analysis that explores the impact of varying each cost and benefit estimate
over an arbitrary range that extends from 50 percent of the base case to 150
percent. In the simplest case of equal base-case costs and benefits, Hahn's
sensitivity analysis thus creates a factor-of-three ratio between net benefits
for the best case and worst case scenarios. Reporting that this sensitivity
analysis yields only a ten percentage point swing in regulatory success rate,
Hahn concludes that his findings are robust.9 5
Despite his earlier objection to assigning "totally arbitrary" values to
unquantified benefits, Hahn appears to be little bothered by this resort to an
equally arbitrary range of uncertainty. How plausible is Hahn's range? In
some cases, Hahn's range actually overstates the level of uncertainty
reflected in the agency's RIA, mainly because the agency's own
assessment (in violation of canons of responsible cost-benefit analysis) fails
to acknowledge uncertainties, fails to state the assumptions used to fill gaps
in knowledge, and fails to offer a sensitivity analysis exploring the
consequences of altering these assumptions over plausible values in order
to establish ranges of plausible estimates of cost, risk and regulatory
benefit. 96 In other cases, however, agencies do follow good practice and do
94. See HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 40.
95. See Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1034-35.
96. See, e.g., EPA, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, Emergency Response
Division, Regulatory Impact Analysis of Proposed Revisions to the Oil Pollution Prevention
Regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 112, at 4-30, 5-16, 5-19, 5-34 (1993) (noting that a midpoint "best
estimate" has been provided in place of cost or benefit estimate ranges); Permit-Required
Confined Spaces, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,462, 4,543-48 (Jan. 14, 1993) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1910) (offering only single estimates for benefits in terms of fatalities prevented and lost
work avoided, and single estimates for costs of compliance); Process Safety Management of
Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,356, 6,401-
02 (Feb. 24, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (providing annual best estimates for
costs and benefits in terms of risk reduction and injuries avoided); Rule for Underground
Construction, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,824, 23,847 (June 2, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926)
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generate ranges of cost and benefit estimates. When this is done, the
ranges that result often greatly exceed the three-fold interval arbitrarily
established by Hahn. Indeed, it is easily shown that simply altering
discount rates and life values across the range identified by Hahn (three to
seven percent and three to seven million dollars) can yield a factor-of-six
variation in calculated net benefits-before taking into account any
uncertainties in ex ante estimates of cost and physical benefit.97 Marrying
this six-fold valuation uncertainty to the two- to ten-fold (and sometimes
higher) range of uncertainty found in estimates of many quantified physical
benefits yields a total uncertainty that plausibly spans a 12- to 60-fold
range of uncertainty. 98 Then one must factor in the additional uncertainties
associated with unquantified costs and benefits. 99
(providing approximate annual costs and benefits in single numbers rather than ranges).
When agencies or their contractors generate artificially "certain" point estimates by failing
to follow good practice for cost-benefit analysis, there are two possible responses. One
response, which Hahn seems to favor, is simply to take the agency estimate at face value
and proceed to judge the rule by the numbers generated in the Regulatory Impact
Assessment (RIA) (adjusted by Hahn's standardizing assumptions). The other response,
which I favor, is to conclude that the agency study is not well-done, that the outcome is
numerically indeterminate, and that there is a need for a closer look at the rule.
97. To see this, consider a hypothetical rule that saves one life per year for ten years,
after a 20-year latency period. Valuing those lives at $3 million each and discounting at 7%
yields a net present value of $5.5 million. Valuing those same lives at $7 million each and
discounting at 3% yields a present value of $33 million, a factor-of-six range of variation.
98. Consider, for example, the EPA's RIA for the rule on marine vessel loading and
unloading, which is included in Hahn's database. See Hahn Unpublished Spreadsheet,
supra note 73, at row 31. The EPA estimated the health benefits of one option at $77
million to $4.8 billion (in 1994 dollars) and a second, more limited, alternative at $3.1 to
$37 million in 1994 dollars. The same RIA offers variant estimates for benefits to
agriculture on the order of $1.4 to $27 billion in 1994 dollars, yielding a total range that
extends from $80 million to nearly $1.4 billion. See EPA, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR MARINE VESSEL LOADING AND UNLOADING
OPERATIONS AND NESHAP FOR MARINE VESSEL LOADING AND UNLOADING OPERATIONS,
RIN No. 2060-AD02, at ES-2, 6-1 to 6-10 (1995); see also Final Water Quality Guidance
for the Great Lakes System, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,366 (Mar. 23, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
9, 122, 123, 131, 132) (costs ranging from $60 to $380 million per year in 1994 dollars);
EPA, OFFICE OF GROUND WATER AND DRINKING WATER, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS: PHASE V SYNTHETIC ORGANIC AND
INORGANIC CHEMICALS, RIN No. 2040-AB 11, at 1-4, 1-5 (1992) (estimating costs at
between $64 to $760 million, and benefits between $11 and $304 million); EPA, OFFICE OF
AIR AND RADIATION, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL WOOD HEATER NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARD,
RIN No. 2060-AB68, at 10-11 to 10-14 (1986) (offering ranges of PM reduction benefits
under three scenarios, with a range of over $1.7 billion between low and high estimates).
99. Hahn potentially seriously undervalues even regulations to which he assigns
positive benefits. RIAs often have narratively described benefits that are not monetized and
cannot be shoe-homed into Hahn's limited list of benefits. See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE OF AIR
AND RADIATION, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR MARINE VESSEL LOADING AND
UNLOADING OPERATIONS AND NESHAP FOR MARINE VESSEL LOADING AND UNLOADING
OPERATIONS, RIN No. 2060-AD02, at ES-2, 6-1 to 6-10 (1995) (discussing unquantified
benefits of reduced noncarcinogenic pollutant exposure, decreased materials damage, and
increased productivity); EPA, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS AND PLANNING, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS, RIN No. 2060-
[58:2
2006] EVALUATING Go VERNMENT REGULA TORY PERFORMANCE 387
As recent experience with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq makes
clear in rather dramatic fashion, the confidence level of an estimate is often
just as important to report as the estimate itself That is why widely agreed
principles of cost-benefit analysis hold that "[b]est estimates should be
presented along with a description of the uncertainties."' 00 This means all
uncertainties, sans imposition of artificial boundaries.
What of the scorecardists' habit of using mid-points of agency ranges as
"best" estimates of costs and benefits? It is defensible only if two rather
heroic assumptions hold: (1) the distribution of probabilities across the
range of possible outcomes is known, and (2) the distribution happens to be
centered on the mid-point of the agency range.
These assumptions are not easy to defend as categorical propositions.
As I and others have pointed out, many benefits (particularly those
involving reduction of noncancer health and ecological risks) preclude such
assumptions because the distribution of probabilities is unknown, making
"best guess" an elusive concept. 10 1
That is why OMB recently advised agencies that, rather than relying
exclusively on best guess estimates, "[ijf the uncertainty in the estimates-
for example, fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of knowledge-
prevents construction of a scientifically defensible probability distribution,
you should describe the benefits and costs under plausible alternative
AC42, at 12-10, 12-11 (1994) (devoting subchapters to unquantified benefits such as
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing landfill odor); EPA, OFFICE OF AIR AND
RADIATION, OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: CLEAN FUEL
FLEET PROGRAM, RIN No. 2060-AD32, 32, 41-43 (June 1993) (noting that decreased
petroleum consumption, energy conservation, and new technology development may be
significant additional benefits).
100. ARROW, supra note 66, at 222.
101. See, e.g., ABA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECTION, COMMENTS ON OMB'S DRAFT
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND THE FORMAT OF
ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS, in Letter from William Funk, Section Chair-Elect, to Lorraine
Hunt, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, at 3-4 (April 20, 2003) (on file
with author); see also Parker, supra note 23, at 1391-92 (making note of the difficulties in
assigning a monetary value to benefits). It is important to remember, in this regard, that
noncancer health and ecological risks, in particular, are poorly understood and thought to
exhibit sharp discontinuities or thresholds that require careful consideration of the
contribution of multiple sources to cumulative risk. See, e.g., EPA, Unfinished Business: A
Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems app. 2, at 1-1, 1-2 (1987) [hereinafter
Unfinished Business] (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). According to
Unfinished Business,
There are thousands of different chemicals in the environment that may cause
adverse human health effects .... EPA has had great difficulty in analyzing non-
cancer health effects .... Most program offices do not actually assess risks from
non-carcinogens.... They merely evaluate the extent to which a regulatory
option prevents exposures above the RID [reference dose or acceptable daily
intake] without an explicit calculation of risk.
Id. app. 2, at 1-1, 1-2; see also id. app. 3, Report of the Ecological Risk Group, at 5 (noting
that due to massive data gaps and conceptual uncertainties ecological risk assessment "only
rarely is quantitative and almost never probabilistic").
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assumptions." 10 2  Scorecards acquire the appearance of objectivity and
precision only by ignoring good practice and occluding these uncertainties.
3. Ignoring Distributive Impacts and Ethical Concerns
According to the Annapolis Principles of sound cost-benefit analysis, "a
good [cost-benefit] analysis will also identify important distributional
consequences [of a policy]." 10 3 This advice is likewise the counsel of both
OMB and EPA guidelines for economic analysis. 10 4  The Regulatory
Flexibility Act requires separate analysis of the economic impact of a rule
on small businesses. 105 The statistical life values now in use presume that
the incremental risk in question is small 10 6 and may not be mechanistically
applied in situations involving higher-than-incremental risk since that
would raise separate ethical issues. 107
Cost-benefit analysis typically focuses on estimating aggregate social
costs and benefits. Though actual examples of such analysis on the benefit
side can be rather hard to find, nothing precludes an agency or analyst from
also including in its assessment a separate analysis of the likely impacts of
the rule on racial minorities, poor people, small businesses, medically
vulnerable groups, or simply people who may bear a disproportionate share
of risk (in the absence of the rule) or burden (if the rule is passed). Strictly
numerical scorecards, however, have no way to accommodate such
nuances, and so they invariably ignore them.
C. Why Such Errors Are Inherent to Scorecards
Though they seldom do so in practice, one can imagine rule-specific
cost-benefit analyses taking account of unquantified costs and benefits,
102. OMB, Guidelines to Standardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of
Accounting Statements: Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies from
Jacob J. Lew, Director, M-00-08, at 15 (Mar. 22, 2000).
103. See ARROW, supra note 66, at 8.
104. See OMB GUIDANCE (2003), supra note 75, at 131 ("[Y]our regulatory analysis
should provide a separate description of distributional effects (i.e. how both benefits and
costs are distributed among sub-populations of particular concern)..."); EPA, GUIDELINES
FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 139-40 (2000) (calling for analysis of the impact of
regulatory costs on employment, profitability, plant closure, competitiveness, and small
businesses, as well as "disproportionate" impacts on minorities, low-income populations,
children, and any risk to individuals above generally accepted norms).
105. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
106. See OMB GUIDANCE (2003), supra note 75, at 146 ("You should make clear that
these terms [value of a statistical life] refer to the measure of willingness to pay for
reductions in small risks of premature death. They have no application to an identifiable
individual or the very large reductions in individual risks.").
107. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, Replies to Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Ethical Critique, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 368 (Robert N.
Stavins ed., 4th ed. 2000) ("Treatises on the subject make clear that certain ethical or
political principles may irreversibly dominate the advantages and disadvantages capturable
by cost-benefit analyses.").
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faithfully and accurately describing the uncertainties afflicting the analysis,
and exploring the distributive impacts and ethical concerns that arise, on
occasion, to trump the results of aggregate cost-benefit analysis. One also
can imagine rule-specific RIAs that examine the consequences of erring in
one direction or another and assign special weight to avoiding large and
irreversible harms. 108
The Main Scorecards, however, pay no attention to such matters, and it
is hard to see how they could do so while remaining true to the mechanistic
and deterministic methodology that traditionally has both defined them and
garnered them wide publicity.
Proponents of scorecards suggest that they might be adapted by
"add[ing] a column to Morrall's famous table that specifies important
qualitative factors that should also be considered in reaching a decision." 10
9
The problem with this answer is that the entries in such a column either
would have to be quite long and nuanced, in many cases, or else they
would fail to shed light on how important these qualitative factors are, why
they are important, and on whether, how, and to what degree they alter (or
should alter) the decision. Moreover, I suspect that the crafting of each
entry in that column inevitably would embroil one in making heuristic
judgments that other analysts might contest, thereby undermining the
seeming objectivity and determinism for which scorecards are well-known
and widely cited.
In short, such a column would either be (1) a meaningless vertical
appendix included for appearances' sake, or (2) if given weight and
meaning, a series of contestable entries, the crafting of which would propel
analysts far down the road toward the approach I favor-careful
investigation (or reinvestigation) of the quantitative and qualitative merits
of each individual rule.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE TO SCORECARDS: RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS
BASED ON IMPROVED AGENCY ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
Proponents of scorecards often claim victory by default. Citing the
maxim that "it takes a theory to beat a theory," one scorecardist has alleged
that since scorecard critics have not offered an alternative the method
therefore stands vindicated, faux de mieux. 
110
108. In fact, Hahn and Sunstein have recently proposed a new executive order that would
call on agencies to consider both quantified and unquantifiable costs and benefits as well as
uncertainties and distributive impacts. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New
Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002).
109. Hahn, Response to Critics, supra note 8, at 1030.
110. Id. at 1052.
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The maxim is witty but wrong. As anyone knowledgeable in the
scientific method will appreciate, it does not take a theory to beat a theory.
All it takes is one well-established fact that contradicts the theory.
Moreover, science has never proceeded on the basis that theories are
presumed valid until a superior alternative theory is provided. On the
contrary, the burden of persuasion in science has always rested, as it
should, on the proponent of the theory, who must show that his or her
theory explains all the relevant data.
The "theory" at issue in this case, of course, is the claim that a numbers-
only approach to multi-rule analysis yields an unbiased and reasonably
accurate picture of the cost-benefit rationality of social regulation. I have
argued that scorecardists have not carried their burden of proving such
methods reliable, and I have offered numerous and significant reasons to
deem their methods presumptively unreliable. Under this circumstance,
one obvious alternative to unreliable scorecards is simple humility about
the state of our knowledge. As scholars have understood since at least the
time of Socrates, wisdom sometimes lies in acknowledging that one doesn't
know the answer.
Beyond a recommendation of all appropriate humility, this Part outlines
three affirmative recommendations for reform. First, I argue that we
should replace reductionist, cross-cutting scorecards with case-by-case
investigation of leading examples (or allegations) of regulatory failure,
whether such failure takes the form of under-regulation, over-regulation, or
simply ineffective regulation. Second, agencies need to establish a basis
for such programmatic reviews by improving their rule-specific analysis in
specific ways that this Part will describe. Third, agencies also should
improve the quality and clarity of their explanations of reasons for adopting
particular rules.
A. The Case for Retrospective Reviews
If numbers-only scorecards are excessively reductionist, the obvious
alternative approach to evaluating regulatory performance is careful case-
by-case analysis of the most controversial rules in a manner loosely
analogous to FAA investigations of airplane crashes. This alternative
approach does not require the abandonment of economic analysis. It
simply requires conducting such analysis in accordance with established
principles of responsible cost-benefit analysis that scorecardists themselves
(in other contexts) have embraced. This requires carefully investigating
both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of each regulatory decision,
taking into account what is known and not known about the costs and
benefits of various options for response, looking retrospectively (where
possible) at actual costs and benefits rather than ex ante guesses, and giving
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full consideration to ethical and moral issues raised along the way.
Because it is time- and labor-intensive, this approach should be reserved
for the most significant new regulations and for reanalysis of selected past
regulations-or failures to regulate-that have been frequently or
prominently cited as leading exemplars of regulatory irrationality. "
Scorecardists appear to assume that irrational regulation is invariably
caused by insufficient efforts to quantify and monetize costs and benefits;
hence their focus on requiring ever more elaborate numeric and monetary
analysis. 1 2  But failure to quantify and monetize is not the universal
culprit. Regulatory failures often arise from gaps in agencies' jurisdiction
or from congressional micromanagement that compels particular actions." 
3
The case-study (or accident investigation) approach that I recommend is
not only superior as an indicator of whether a regulation is excessively or
insufficiently zealous, it is the only method that has a chance of revealing
why the error occurred.
Of course, I am not so optimistic as to assume that my approach will lead
different observers, bringing different professional skills or ideological
propensities, to arrive at identical conclusions at the end of the in-depth
investigations that I prescribe. Indeed, I foresee disagreements. This
means that some attention will need to be paid, if my approach is adopted,
to finding suitable arrangements for insuring that investigations are
conducted by small but professionally and ideologically balanced panels of
experts, rather than by single individuals who emerge periodically from
behind a green curtain (so to speak) to report their findings. 114
111. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1414-22.
112. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, A Review of the Office of
Management and Budget's Draft Guidelines for Conducting Regulatory Analysis, REG.
ANALYSIS 03-6, 2 (2003) ("Recommendation 1: OMB should emphasize that benefit-cost
analysis (BCA) is generally preferred to cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and encourage
agencies to monetize as many costs and benefits as possible."); see also HAHN 2000, supra
note 7, at 36 (rating agencies based on degree to which they monetize benefits).
113. Well-known examples of regulatory gaps include the Food and Drug
Administration's notorious lack of statutory jurisdiction to regulate tobacco or dietary
supplements and EPA's lack of clear and direct regulatory jurisdiction over emissions of
non-point sources of water pollution. Instances of congressional micromanagement
likewise abound. For two examples involving rules in Hahn's database, see National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,666 (Mar. 8, 1990)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (implementing a statutory mandate to elect cleanup of waste
sites over containment in most cases); Double Hull Standards For Vessels Carrying Oil in
Bulk, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,222, 36,222 (Aug. 12, 1992) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 155, 157; 46
C.F.R. pts. 30, 32, 70, 90, 172) (imposing specific requirements for double hulls on vessels
carrying oil in bulk).
114. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561, 563, 565 (2004),
outlines a mechanism for convening balanced committees that are roughly analogous,
though much larger, than the investigative panels I have in mind. However, given the
polarization of American opinion on all sorts of issues, including regulatory policy, I expect
that the credibility of regulatory review panels will depend on their being situated outside of
the primary agency. More suitable candidates for convening authority might include the
Government Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office) and the National
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The reports of these panels may not (probably will not) end all
regulatory controversies. Nonetheless, their analyses (which may include
minority opinions) are almost certain to prove far more enlightening in the
end, and much more transparent, than the jargon-laden abracadabra of cost-
benefit analysis traditionally conceived-a genre that virtually requires the
reader to take the word of the analyst and accept conclusions at face value,
unless she is prepared to incur the huge transactions costs involved in
attempting to peer behind the wizard's curtain of numbers.
That said, even retrospective analysis will not succeed in exposing errors
of judgment or rebuilding public trust in government unless and until
agencies (EPA, in particular) improve both the quality of their initial
regulatory impact analysis of each rule and the quality of their public
explanations.
B. Improving Regulatory Impact Assessment
Despite our many disagreements, there is one important conclusion on
which I broadly agree with scorecardists and their allies. It is that agency
explanations and analyses are often inadequate and almost certainly could
be improved. 11 5 This is an important point because all outside appraisals of
agency rationality-be they executive, judicial, legislative, or academic-
rest on the foundation laid by these initial agency analyses. Yet the
analyses themselves often supply, at best, a through-the-glass-darkly view
of agency thinking.
One example, drawn from among many that could have been selected,
will illustrate the point. The EPA's Municipal Waste Combustor Rule was
promulgated to reduce air emissions of particulate matter: sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, dioxins, and three heavy metals (mercury, cadmium, and
lead). 116  The EPA's RIA devotes three full chapters (87 pages) to
quantifying compliance costs and the distribution of costs among firms,
state and local governments, and households." 7 The RIA devotes one
chapter (ten pages) to describing the benefits of the rule, of which four
pages are devoted to monetizing the benefits of reducing particulate matter
and sulfur dioxide emissions. Six pages are devoted to describing the
adverse health consequences of exposure to lead, cadmium, and mercury-
without any effort to tie that narrative to a demonstration of risk from the
Academy of Sciences.
115. See HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 34-35 (critiquing the incompleteness of agency
RIAs).
116. See EPA, OAQPS, Economic Impact Analysis for Proposed Emissions Standards
and Guidelines for Municipal Waste Combustors, EPA-450/3-91-029, Ch. 5-7 (Mar. 1994)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author) [hereinafter Municipal Waste Combustor
RIA].
117. See id.
[58:2
2006] EVALUATING GOVERNMENT REGULA TORYPERFORMANCE 393
quantities of these compounds that issue from municipal waste combustors,
or to place municipal waste combustor emissions in the perspective of total
nationwide emissions of, or population exposure to, these toxins. 118
As a result, nowhere in EPA's preambular explanation or in its 171-page
Economic Impact Analysis does EPA actually address the fundamental
questions that confronted risk managers in that rule: (1) Are current levels
of emissions of heavy metals and dioxin from municipal waste combustors
creating a significant human health or ecosystem risk?, (2) What portion of
total emissions, and associated risk, is accounted for by air emissions of
dioxins and heavy metals from municipal hazardous waste combustors, and
how significant an improvement will the proposed rule yield?, and (3) If
the evidence of significant and direct risk from these sources is
inconclusive, is the potential harm from municipal waste combustor
emissions great enough-due to the persistence and capability for bio-
accumulation of the toxins involved-to warrant strict regulation
nonetheless?
The agency observes: "The absence of sufficient exposure-response and
valuation information precludes a comprehensive benefits analysis for
many of the [multiple waste combustors] pollutants."'1 9 This being the
case, it certainly is unfair to expect the agency to comprehensively quantify
and monetize the benefit of reducing combustor emissions of dioxin and
heavy metals by 99 percent and 70 to 80 percent, respectively. But surely
courts, policymakers, and the public are entitled to some explanation of
why it is that agency risk managers deem emissions of dioxin and heavy
metals from municipal waste combustors a sufficient risk to warrant a very
considerable expenditure of public and private funds. Surely that
explanation should go beyond a general description of the toxicity of these
substances followed by the observation that "[t]he total benefits would be
higher if benefits from reductions of other pollutants were valuated
[sic]." 120
From the deficiency of the agency analysis in this case, I do not draw the
inference that Hahn draws, that EPA's municipal waste combustor rule is a
seven billion dollar example of regulatory overkill. 121 Nor do I conclude
that it is a regulatory success story. I simply conclude that the analysis
should have been better.
118. See id. at 8-1to 8-10.
119. Emissions Guidelines Municipal Waste Combustors Proposed Rule, supra note 74,
at 48,239.
120. Id.
121. See Parker, supra note 23, at 1467 app. C, row 32.
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In fact, the municipal waste combustor rule supplies one of many
examples that might be adduced of what I will call the "all-or-nothing
syndrome" in agency regulatory impact assessment. 122  This syndrome
manifests itself when the agency arrives at the point that the agency must
decide whether to try to quantify and monetize a benefit. If the decision is
made to quantify and/or monetize-because the data are available or the
agency deems the magnitude of the rule worth the resources required to
assemble the data-then the agency (more precisely, its contractor) will go
to great lengths and spare no expense in the effort, yielding an analysis that
is often impressively detailed and rigorous.1 23 If, on the other hand, the
agency decides that full quantification and monetization is either
impossible or not cost-effective in that case, then the agency tends to
dismiss the whole issue with a placeholder of the kind quoted above. In
analytical terms, all or (almost) nothing.
Agencies must do better if they hope for public acceptance of their
regulatory program. The American public will not accept large costs from
regulation if they do not understand or appreciate the benefits.
What is to be done? Hahn takes the view that the road to improvement
lies in requiring greater quantification and monetization (indeed, he rates
agencies according to the frequency with which they monetize costs and
benefits).' 24 I obviously do not share that view. But I do concede that
agency analysis needs to be improved, particularly in its treatment of
noncancer health and ecosystem benefits.
In my view, the way forward lies in the search for a middle way between
all or nothing analytically: between insistence on complete quantification
and/or monetization (disregarding everything not quantified) at one
extreme and renouncing all effort at even first-order approximation at the
122. Compare Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000); see, e.g.,
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (undertaking elaborate and extensive risk assessment of zone
health impacts), with NSPS Municipal Waste Combustors Proposed Rule, supra note 76, at
48,198 (stating only that the rule complies with a consent decree and is based on the
Administrator's determination that emissions from municipal waste combustors cause or
contribute significantly to pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare).
123. The combustor rule is not a great example of agency zeal in tracking down and
monetizing benefits since the agency merely estimated incremental reductions in emissions
of sulfur oxides and particulate matter and then applied a standard per-ton formula for
monetizing those benefits. (The effort had been expended previously,) For a clearer
example, see EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Particulate Matter: Proposed
Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638 (Dec. 13, 1996), which presents a very detailed,
sophisticated, and high estimate of health and welfare benefits of reducing particulate matter
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) standard.
124. See, e.g., HAHN 2000, supra note 7, at 36 tbl. 3-1.
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other. This middle path lies in encouraging and helping agencies find new
ways to capture and explain heuristically the general significance (if not the
precise magnitude) of hitherto unquantified risks and regulatory benefits,
and the consequences of erring through over- or under-regulation.
This need not require additional time and resources, only more careful
thought about how best to utilize existing resources. Surely some of the
money and effort spent trying to quantify costs and cancer benefits to three
significant digits would be better spent if redirected to the task of forming a
grounded judgment of the ordinal significance of benefits that cannot be
quantified.
The approach just outlined, I recognize, is not a specific "solution" so
much as a general direction for constructive change. Nonetheless, I believe
it is a useful direction-and a useful alternative to the all-or-nothing
tendency in agency analysis and the all-or-nothing debate over cost-benefit
analysis that currently divides the scholarly community.
While the foregoing recommendation seeks to improve agency analysis,
it is also vitally important, for reasons seen in more detail below, for
agencies not only to deepen their analysis, but to tighten and clarify their
explanations.
C. Clarifying Agency Explanations
Anyone who has picked up the Federal Register and waded through a
preambular explanation and a final rule will have encountered a familiar
phenomenon: five or six pages of rule, preceded by fifty or more Federal
Register pages setting forth detailed agency explanations and/or responses
to the most technical and arcane comments, and nowhere in sight any sign
of the one thing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and common
sense require-a clear, concise, coherent explanation of why the agency
chose to adopt that particular rule.
Take, for example, the EPA's promulgation of its controversial revision
of the National Primary Drinking Standards for Arsenic.125  Table 1
provides a brief overview of the contents of the preamble and final rule
published in the Federal Register on January 22, 2001. It is typical of the
EPA's approach to rule explanation.
125. See EPA, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, Arsenic and Clarifications
to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22,
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
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Table 1
Contents of EPA Notice of Final Rule on
National Primary Drinking Standards for Arsenic
Item Length
Summary of what rule does 2 para.
Effective Dates 2 para.
List of Abbreviations 1 page
Table of Contents 2 pages
Procedural Background and Summary of Final Rule 15 pages
Statement of Statutory Authority 1 page
Rationales for Regulatory Decisions 29 pages
Response to Major Comments 23 pages
Administrative and Other Requirements 8 pages
Text of Rule 6 pages
Needless to say, an explanation of "rationales" that occupies 29 Federal
Register pages (or 52 such pages if one includes responses to comments)
hardly qualifies as the "concise and general" explanation for which the
APA calls. Moreover, as far as this writer is able to discern, EPA's sole
concession to President Clinton's "Plain English" directive was to present
its lengthy, jargon-laden explanation of the rule in a question and answer
format. 126 One will search that notice in vain for anything resembling a
concise, readable explanation of why EPA chose the particular maximum
concentration limit (MCL) for arsenic (10 micrograms/liter) that it adopted.
Equally impossible to find in the final notice is any single place where
the major objections that would come back to haunt the rulemaking in later
months-and which were already vociferously sounding in the
administrative process-are collected, reported, and cogently and
persuasively addressed. 127
126. Compare William J. Clinton, Plain Language in Government Writing:
Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,885
(June 1, 1998), with EPA, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, Arsenic and
Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. at
7052 (explaining that the agency implemented the Plain Language directive mainly by
organizing explanations in question and answer format).
127. A clear early warning sign of trouble was seen, or might have been seen, in the fact
that the Clinton EPA's RIA found only $35 to $190 million in quantifiable benefits
(depending on one's assumptions about discount rate, latency period and value of cancer
averted) versus a predicted $170 to $200 million in costs. A disproportionate share of these
costs would be passed on to relatively poor, rural users of small water systems. See EPA,
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance
and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7010, 7016. The EPA also
pointed out, deep in the bowels of its 50-page explanation, that only bladder and lung cancer
benefits were quantified, that other health benefits of arsenic exposure reduction were
expected, and that the technologies used to control arsenic would also filter out other
[58:2
2006] EVALUATING GOVERNMENT REGULATORY PERFORMANCE 397
The result was entirely predictable: Opposing interests, and denizens of
opposing ideological camps, took their own meaning out of the turgid mass
of text that made up the EPA explanation, supplied the gaps in that
explanation with their own interpretations, and went to war.'28 Alas,
arsenic is not an isolated example.
What is going on? It would appear that, goaded by judicial appeals and
court decisions, agencies have developed the tradition of offering
extremely long explanations densely packed with technical detail and
responsive to a host of comments but targeted only at an insider audience.
The implicit assumption behind current practice seems to be that if the
APA requires "a concise general statement" of a rule's basis, then an
extremely detailed, lengthy, and arcane explanation is so much the
better. 1
29
I respectfully disagree. Democratic accountability is defeated when
agency explanations are so long, diffuse, and technical that no one but
insiders can fathom them.
Agencies traditionally have written explanations in language which
implicitly assume that the only audience that matters is rule participants,
litigants, and reviewing courts. What has changed in recent years is that
the relevant audience has widened. With the advent of congressional
review and the politicization of administrative law generally, the relevant
audience for the explanation of complex agency decisions now includes
Congress, the media, the scholarly community (including both academics
and think tanks), and the public. In a very real sense, agencies are now "on
trial," in the court of public opinion, with every rule they issue. Yet their
explanations to date show little or no awareness that times have changed as
has their relevant audience.
harmful pollutants. Unfortunately, the EPA did not see fit to specify what those pollutants
were or how much they would be reduced, nor did it offer any clear judgment as to the
significance of the ancillary benefits expected from reducing arsenic exposure. The
discussion of unquantified benefits was vague: suggesting significance but not documenting
it, even to the extent of naming the other pollutants that would be filtered out. See id. at
7012. What was not vague was the EPA's prediction that the rule would cost (largely rural)
users of very small water systems over $300 per year. See id. at 7011.
128. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic ofArsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 225 (2002); Thomas
0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002); Floyd Frost,
Poisonous Decision, A Low Arsenic Standard Carries a High Cost, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,
2001, at B5; Editorial, Don't Mix Politics with Arsenic, DETROIT NEWS, May 1, 2001, at A6
(praising President Bush's stance on the EPA rule); Dennis Byrne, Commentary, Hiding the
Real Pictures; Two Web Sites Expose Facts Advocates Won't Tell You, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30,
2001, at 15 (contemplating the cost of regulations and society's gain from these costs); Ian
Murray, Needless Worry About Arsenic in Our Water, Mar. 29, 2001, THE RECORD (Bergen
County, NJ), available at http://www.stats.org/record (giving information about the costs of
implementing the EPA's regulations); Jason K. Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, EPA 's Arsenic
Rule: The Benefits of the Standard Do Not Justify the Costs, AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for
Reg. Analysis, REG. ANALYSIS 01-021 (2001).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
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Overworked journalists, OMB economists, and Hill staff are not going to
slog through forty to fifty Federal Register-length pages of technical jargon
for each major rule in an effort to tease out the agency rationale for its
action. And if the agency's explanation gives no clear basis for its
judgment that unquantified risks and regulatory benefits are significant,
then it should come as little surprise to agencies when entrenched
regulatory skeptics assume such benefits are insignificant and zero them
out-even though doing so is methodologically wrong.
The end result of continuing the old tradition of legal explanation to a
new, larger, politically polarized but technically uninformed audience is an
all too predictable cycle of special interest spinning, he-says-she-says
journalism, public confusion, and political polarization.
To this problem one remedy, at least, seems as simple and obvious as it
is contrary to current practice: While agencies should continue to offer
however long an explanation they please (or feel they must to preserve
their options on appeal), they also should furnish the clear and concise
statement that the APA requires as to why the agency decided to adopt the
rule that it adopted. This concise statement, written in plain English,
should include an explanation of why the agency concluded that the
problem addressed in that rule is significant, the alternative responses the
agency considered, and why the agency chose the alternative that it
adopted. The statement also should include, in cases in which cost is a
legally relevant variable, a concise explanation of both the relevant
uncertainties in the data and the reasons the agency concluded that the
quantified and unquantified benefits of the rule are "worth" the quantified
and unquantified costs.
To speak clearly is to think clearly. While the changes I have just
recommended are not panaceas--disagreements at some level will never go
away-it is hard for this observer to imagine any changes that are more
straightforward or more likely to improve both agency decisions and public
acceptance of them than the two simple changes outlined above.
CONCLUSION
No serious scholar believes that health, safety, and environmental
regulation has been, on balance, a bad deal for the American public. On
the contrary, even its critics concede that social regulation, overall, has
yielded far more benefits-even within their accounting system-than
costs. 130 The majority of these numerically measured benefits derive from
a relative handful of very large rules, however, and certain scholars have
130. See, e.g., OMB GUIDANCE (2003), supra note 78, at 9 (charting out "annual benefits
and costs of major federal rules"); HAiN 2000, supra note 7, at 38 (finding that large
positive net benefits stem from major regulations overall).
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raised serious concerns about whether many other rules, large and small,
cost more than they are worth. Numerical scorecards have been created,
and gained influence, as a way of addressing that question. They have
answered that question emphatically in the negative and, in so doing, have
helped launch and propel an antiregulatory backlash that is now in full
flower and that seeks both to curb the advance of health, safety, and
environmental regulation in most (though not all) areas and to roll it back
in others.
For the reasons discussed above, I continue to believe that regulatory
decisions cannot be reduced to numbers alone, and that numbers-only
regulatory scorecards are not a valid way to measure the rationality of
regulation. There is an alternative, and better, way to address the valid
concern that preoccupies critics of regulation. It begins with improving
agencies' primary analysis and their presentation of that analysis in the
ways described above. It continues by recommending the occasional
convening-in the case of highly controversial regulations, attempts to
deregulate, or failures to regulate-of small yet ideologically diverse
advisory panels to investigate the facts and agency's analyses with the goal
of crafting a consensus view (or at least a clearly articulated set of views)
as to the justification, or lack thereof, for the agency decision. Gradually,
case-by-case, an empirically grounded picture of regulation will emerge
and, with it, a clearer understanding of the causes of validly demonstrated
failures, and the remedy.
Will this alternative work? There is no clear reason why it shouldn't. It
is, after all, simply a variant of the old-fashioned case study method, a
method which has been employed with positive results since roughly the
time of Aristotle in a wide variety of fields, including regulatory reform. 31
The only things that my alternative adds to this time-honored tradition are a
proposal that the case studies be linked to prominent claims of regulatory
failure (the better to clear the poisoned air that now envelops regulation)
and that investigations be undertaken by "balanced" panels of investigators
(reflecting my judgment that the climate of opinion, sadly, is now so
polarized that liberals and conservatives often will not trust a case study
unless it is done, at least in part, by one of "theirs").
131. See, e.g., Nat'l Acad. of Pub. Admin., Ctr. for the Econ. and the Environ., Learning
from Innovations in Environmental Protection: Commissioned Research Papers,
http://www.napawash.org/pc-economy-environment/learning-texts.html (last visited May
5, 2006).
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Granted, the inductive path is arduous and expensive, but the stakes are
measured in billions of dollars and thousands of lives. Given the extreme
complexity of most regulatory decisions-particularly in the realm of
health, safety, and the environment-it may well be the only viable
alternative.
